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Abstract Spatial memory is crucial to our daily lives and
in part strongly depends on automatic, implicit memory
processes. This study investigates the neurocognitive basis
of conscious and unconscious inﬂuences of object–location
memory in amnesic patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome
(N = 23) and healthy controls (N = 18) using a process-
dissociation procedure in a computerized spatial memory
task. As expected, the patients performed substantially
worse on the conscious memory measures but showed even
slightly stronger effects of unconscious inﬂuences than the
controls. Moreover, a delayed test administered after
1 week revealed a strong decline in conscious inﬂuences
in the patients, while unconscious inﬂuences were not
affected. The presented results suggest that conscious and
unconscious inﬂuences of spatial memory can be clearly
dissociated in Korsakoff’s syndrome.
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Introduction
Object-location memory is one of the commonest types of
spatial memory. Everyday we need to locate personal items
such as glasses, keys or wallets. The process of ﬁnding an
object in its usual environment may be guided both con-
sciously and unconsciously. We can, for instance,
intentionally evoke a vivid recollection of where we have
last seen the object but we may also, without being aware
of the underlying reason, seemingly automatically start
searching in the right place. Hasher and Zacks (1979)
already made the distinction between conscious and
unconscious processing of spatial information three dec-
ades ago. They argued that because of its ecological
signiﬁcance spatial memory encoding progresses mainly or
even fully automatically, that is, without direct attention
and intent. More recently, Caldwell and Masson (2001)
separated unconscious from conscious retrieval of object-
location information in young and older adults. Among
other observations they reported that, relative to the
younger participants, conscious recall in the older adults
was inferior while their unconscious memory functions
appeared intact, suggesting this ability had not deteriorated
with age.
In general, implicit memory seems less susceptible to
cognitive deterioration resulting from aging or neurological
disease than explicit memory (Light and Singh 1987;
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macological drugs have been shown to depress measures of
conscious recollection, free recall and recognition but not
of familiarity-based recognition or primed fragment com-
pletion (Curran et al. 1993; Mintzer and Grifﬁths 1999).
Much less is known, though, about the neurocognitive basis
of implicit spatial memory. Chun and Phelps (1999)
showed that the implicit mastery of spatial displays in a
visual search task was diminished in patients with hippo-
campal lesions. In contrast, Manns and Squire (2001)
demonstrated normal implicit learning on a similar task in
a group of patients with lesions that were focal and
restricted to the hippocampal region. Moreover, Kessels
et al. (2005) observed that, in comparison to explicit
memory, implicit spatial memory functions in cortical
dementia (i.e., Alzheimer’s disease predominantly affect-
ing the medial temporal lobe) were spared. Given these
controversies, we deemed it particularly interesting to
directly compare conscious and unconscious inﬂuences of
spatial memory in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome, that
is, amnesic patients with lesions in the subcortical areas,
using Jacoby’s (1991, 1998) process-dissociation proce-
dure (PDP) adapted for object-location memory (Caldwell
and Masson 2001).
Patients with amnesia due to Korsakoff’s syndrome
typically have damage to diencephalic regions, more spe-
ciﬁcally the mammillary bodies and the thalamus, which
damage is accompanied by cortical atrophy, predominantly
in the prefrontal cortex, due to chronic alcohol abuse and
malnutrition (Kopelman 2002; Mayes 1988). It is exactly
these areas that are thought to be critical for episodic
memory and contextual binding. Arguably, this would also
include spatial memory and the binding of objects to their
locations. There indeed is abundant evidence for substantial
spatial memory impairments in Korsakoff patients (Hold-
stock et al. 2000; Kessels et al. 2000; Mayes et al. 1991;
Shoqeirat and Mayes 1991; Van Asselen et al. 2005). The
context-memory deﬁcit hypothesis claims that contextual
memory (e.g., recalling object locations) is disproportion-
ally affected in Korsakoff’s syndrome compared to target
memory (e.g., recalling object identities; Mayes 1988). The
question is to what extent this also applies to the implicit
retrieval of contextual memory attributes, in other words to
implicit types of spatial memory.
In his pioneering case description of a Korsakoff patient
Clapare `de(1907)isoneofthe ﬁrsttomention intactimplicit
memory to coincide with impaired explicit memory. Con-
clusions in more recent research on implicit memory
functions in Korsakoff’s syndrome are quite mixed, how-
ever, some studies showed spared implicit memory in tasks
priming semantic relations between lexical items (Verfael-
lie et al. 1990), word-completion tests and tasks priming
category exemplars (Graf et al. 1985; Levy et al. 2004; Phaf
et al. 2000) while other authors reported impaired implicit
memory performance in conceptually driven or picture-
naming priming tasks (Brunfaut and d’Ydewalle 1996;
Verfaellie et al. 1996). Interestingly, in their study com-
paring controls and Korsakoff patients Verfaellie et al.
(1992) demonstrated weaker priming effects for the patients
onataskpresumablyreﬂectingimplicitmemoryforabstract
spatial conﬁgurations that could not be verbalized.
The aforementioned ﬁndings clearly illustrate that
observations of spared implicit memory performance in
amnesic patients critically depend on the nature of the task
used. There are various other examples in the literature of
amnesic patients failing on one type of implicit memory
but performing normally on the other. This is often
explained by assuming that in the latter case the controls
were able to further improve their performance by effec-
tively applying explicit memory strategies. Most notably,
Levy et al. (2004) reported corresponding (conceptually
driven) priming performance outcomes in their amnesic
patients and healthy controls while the declarative recog-
nition scores for the patients were at chance level,
suggesting a strict independence of the two memory indi-
ces. In the present study we accordingly control for the
possibility of mutual interactions between conscious and
unconscious memory inﬂuences. Ostergaard (1999) pro-
posed an alternative explanation by suggesting that the
priming tasks administered might have been too easy and
that participants hence relied more on perceptual than on
memory factors, allowing amnesic patients to also perform
relatively well. He concluded that for any type of memory
primed in the prior study phase to have an impact, the
inherent difﬁculty of the task should be carefully consid-
ered. Somewhat differently, Gooding et al. (2000)
suggested that it is implicit memory for novel information
in particular that will show impairments while memory for
familiar material tends to be spared.
In the present study the participants were ﬁrst instructed
to place pictures of everyday objects that were presented on
a computer screen in appropriate locations in a natural
environment (i.e., pictures of various rooms) and memorize
the locations. During a subsequent test they were again
shown the objects and the original scene but now with three
optional locations. Consistent with the aforementioned PDP
participants had to relocate half of the objects in their
designated locations during the Include condition and the
other half in a different location, that is, the Exclude con-
dition. In the former condition, conscious and unconscious
inﬂuences of spatial memory are supposed to strengthen
each other whereas in the latter condition they conﬂict. In
addition to comparing the effects of conscious and uncon-
scious inﬂuences on the immediate recall of spatial memory
of Korsakoff patients with those in healthy volunteers, we
examined the same measures after a 1-week delay as it has
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123been argued that conscious memory functions are particu-
larly prone to decline over time. The reverse is assumed for
unconscious spatial memories, that is, that they might be
less susceptible to neurodegenerative processes and decay
over time, although ﬁndings are inconclusive. Cave (1997),
for example, obtained substantial picture-naming priming
effects for periods of 48 weeks and over. Mitchell (2006)
even showed picture-fragment identiﬁcation priming 17
years after the initial exposure. Squire et al. (1987), in
contrast, argue that priming effects for certain types of
material only persist for a relatively short period. Whether
amnesic individuals such as Korsakoff patients show spared
implicit memory capacities over time is, again, likely to
depend on the type of task used (McAndrews et al. 1987;
Squire et al. 1987). Using a comparable PDP with verbal
material Kopelman and Stanhope (1997) observed levels of
conscious forgetting in Korsakoff patients over a 30-min
retention interval that resembled the levels observed in their
control subjects. Unconscious memory effects in the
patients were, moreover, substantial.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-three inpatients, of whom ﬁve were women,
residing in the Korsakoff clinic of the Vincent van Gogh
Institute, Venray, the Netherlands, all having been diag-
nosed with chronic Korsakoff’s syndrome within one to six
months prior to testing, participated in the study. All ful-
ﬁlled the criteria for DSM-IV Alcohol-Induced Persisting
Amnestic Disorder (American Psychiatric Association
1994) and for Korsakoff’s syndrome as described by
Kopelman (2002) and all had an extensive history of
alcoholism and nutritional depletion, notably thiamine
deﬁciency, as veriﬁed on the basis of medical charts or
family reports. None of the patients fulﬁlled the clinical
criteria for alcohol dementia (Oslin et al. 1998). Eighteen
healthy volunteers matched for age, sex and education were
recruited from the general public and also screened. The
mean age of the patients and the controls was 52.8 years
(SD 7.3 and 6.8, respectively). Classiﬁed on a 7-point
scale, with one reﬂecting little to no training (less than
primary school) and seven the highest obtainable educa-
tional level (academic degree), the mean educational level
for the Korsakoff patients was 4.3 (SD = 1.4) and for the
controls 4.9 (SD = 1.1). The mean handedness scores as
measured by the Dutch version of the Annett Handedness
Inventory (Annett 1970) were 19.4 (SD = 9.6) for the
patients and 19.2 (SD = 9.1) for the controls. The groups
were comparable as to their demographics and handedness.
Neuroradiological reports (CT or MRI) were available for
22 patients; 15 patients showed signs of supra- or infra-
tentorial atrophy and in two patients vascular lesions were
reported; ﬁve patients showed no visible neuroradiological
abnormalities (see Table 1). Although signs of brain atro-
phy and non-speciﬁc white-matter lesions are common in
Korsakoff patients, these are not necessary criteria for the
diagnosis (Kopelman 2002).
With respect to general cognitive ability, the patients
were severely impaired on word-list learning [the Dutch
version of the California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT);
Delis et al. 1987] which can be regarded as a test for item
memory. The scores of 17 of the 18 patients for whom test
results were available were two or more SDs below the
normative mean on standardized immediate reproduction.
Twelve of the 21 patients performing the Tower of London
Test (Shallice 1982) as an index for executive functioning
had scores of two or more SDs below the normative mean.
All participants gave their informed consent prior to
their participation. The experiment was approved by the
local medical ethics committee and conducted in accor-
dance with the Helsinki Declaration.
Materials
The Rooms Task, adapted from Caldwell and Masson
(2001) and Kessels et al. (2005), was run on a Pentium PC
and responses were monitored using a 1500 LCD touch
screen. In a separate short panel study a group of healthy
participants that were not part of the succeeding study were
asked to assign each of 50 digital (5 9 5 cm) color pictures
depicting an everyday object that were presented at the
bottom of the screen to the most probable location of a
large number of alternatives within the (20 9 25 cm)
photographs of one of ﬁve rooms (ten objects per room;
living room, bedroom, study, bathroom and kitchen; see
Fig. 1 for a schematic overview of the task). Based on
these assignments three likely target locations for each
object were selected for the actual experimentation phase,
that is, never the least nor the most frequently chosen (the
least or most appropriate) sites. Two of the locations served
as the distractors in the recognition test. The possible
locations for an object in the room photographs were
indicated by empty squares. After the participant had
indicated the correct position by touching the location on
the screen, a 2 9 2 cm picture of the object appeared at the
identiﬁed location.
Procedure
During the learning phase of the experiment, in each of 40
trials a photograph of a room and an picture of an object
were shown, with an empty square marking the object’s
target location. Participants had to place each object in the
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of the locations for a test they would be taking later
afterward. As recommended by Caldwell and Masson
(2001), all participants had to say the name of all 40 objects
and their designated locations out loud to help the Kor-
sakoff patients focus their attention on the relevant features
of the task. While no time limits were imposed for mem-
orizing the individual objects, all participants completed
the trial series at a constant rate of about 3 s per object. The
order in which the objects were presented was randomized
over participants both during the memorizing stage and the
succeeding recognition test.
The Korsakoff patients took the recognition test after a
1-min break while the controls did so after 15 min, which
latter interval was chosen to avoid ceiling-performance
effects. All participants completed a test trial in which
three empty squares in the room photograph indicated
possible locations (i.e., the target location and two dis-
tractor locations) for the object presented at the bottom of
the screen. In each of the 50 experimental trials, one of two
instructions, that is, Include or Exclude, was shown at the
bottom of the screen and read out loud by the experimenter.
The participants were presented 25 trials in each condition
to which the objects had been randomly assigned. The
order in which the objects were presented was again ran-
domized and different from the order in the learning phase.
Note that ten of the objects (ﬁve in each condition and all
randomly selected per participant) in the recognition test
were new in that they had not been shown in the learning
phase. These new objects served to estimate chance per-
formance, that is, the number of times a participant chose
pre-assigned target locations during the recognition test
without having earlier memorized the particular object-
location pair.
Table 1 Data on the handedness, age, sex, educational level, radiological and neuropsychological backgrounds of the Korsakoff patients
Patient Handedness
a Age Gender Education
b Brain scan Radiological ﬁndings CVLT
Scores
c
Tower of
London
d
1 19 50 M 5 CT Cortical and cerebellar atrophy -41 7
2 13 42 V 4 CT Cortical and cerebellar atrophy -72 5
3 24 50 M 5 CT Cortical atrophy -81 9
4 24 59 M 5 CT Mild cerebellar atrophy
5 17 49 M 5 CT Cortical and cerebellar atrophy -72 3
6 20 46 V 2 CT No abnormalities -81 7
7 24 61 M 2 CT No abnormalities
8 24 49 M 2 MRI Multiple vascular lesions -82 2
9 20 64 V 6 CT Cortical atrophy -42 0
10 20 55 M 5 MRI Mild cortical atrophy -43 2
11 24 42 M 5 CT Mild cerebellar atrophy and left frontal vascular lesion -42 8
12 24 66 M 5 CT Left temporal vascular lesion 28
13 24 60 M 2 CT Cerebellar atrophy 20
14 8 43 V 4 MRI Cerebellar atrophy -82 9
15 24 52 M 5 CT No abnormalities 23
16 24 49 M 5 CT Cortical and infratentorial atrophy -51 6
17 24 55 V 3 CT Cortical and infratentorial atrophy -73 4
18 24 67 M 5 CT Mild cerebellar atrophy -32 7
19 19 49 M 5 CT Cortical and infratentorial atrophy -53 2
20 17 56 M 5 CT Mild cortical atrophy -53 1
21 24 50 M 5 NA -51 9
22 -20 53 M 6 MRI No abnormalities -62 0
23 24 48 M 2 MRI Subcortical atrophy -43 1
CT computer tomography, MRI magnetic resonance imaging, NA not available
a Scores on the Dutch version of the Annett Handedness Inventory; -24 to -8 is left-handed; -8 to 8 is mixed-handed; 8 to 24 is right-handed
b Educational levels scored using 7 categories with 1 indicating little or no formal training and 7 one or more university degrees
c Dutch version of the California verbal learning test (CVLT), immediate reproduction over ﬁve consecutive presentations (standardized scores
for age and sex, mean in norm population is 0, SD = 2)
d Tower of London test (in a comparable reference group mean was 30.6, SD = 2.7)
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123For the Include trials the participants were instructed to
place the object in its original location. In case they failed
to recollect the position, participants were instructed to
allocate the object to the ﬁrst location that came to mind, in
which case their choice might reﬂect unconscious memory
inﬂuences. Thus, in the Include trials both conscious and
unconscious inﬂuences of memory might help produce the
correct answer, that is, the object’s designated location. In
the Exclude trials, the participants were ﬁrst asked to recall
the object’s original location and to subsequently place the
object at a different one. Again, conscious recollection of
the original event was required. However, when they failed
to recall the original position, participants were again
prompted to assign the object to the ﬁrst location that came
to mind. Here, unconscious memory inﬂuences might still
make them select the original site, thus violating the
instructions in this condition. Finally, both the patients and
the controls took the same recognition test 1 week after the
ﬁrst test.
The percentage of objects placed in their original target
locations allows the conscious and unconscious inﬂuences
of memory to be estimated (see Eq. 1) for both conditions:
Include Trials : P targets ðÞ ¼ C þ 1   C ðÞ U ð1Þ
Exclude Trials : P targets ðÞ ¼ 1   C ðÞ U
with C reﬂecting the conscious inﬂuence and U the
unconscious inﬂuence (Caldwell and Masson 2001). The
probabilities of selecting the designated target locations,
the C and U estimates, and chance levels were computed
for each participant separately.
Results
We ﬁrst conducted analyses of variance to determine the
general probability of selecting the designated target
locations for the two conditions separately (i.e., the per-
centage of correct answers in the Include and the
Fig. 1 Schematic overview of
the rooms task (actual picture
size approx. 20 9 25 cm) during
the learning and the test phase.
In the Include trials (a) of the
test participants had to relocate
the objects to the positions they
had occupied previously while
in the Exclude trials (b), they
needed to allocate the object to
a different location (choice of
three). In case the original
location could not be
remembered, in both conditions
participants had to place the
object in the ﬁrst location that
came to mind. Objects that had
not been shown during the
learning phase were introduced
to determine chance
performance (c)
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123percentage of errors in the Exclude condition), with Group
(Patient vs. Controls) as the between-subjects factor and
Delay [Immediate vs. Delayed (1-week) Recall] as the
within-subject factor (see Table 2). Both the Include and
the Exclude condition yielded signiﬁcant effects both for
Group (F[1, 39] = 42.5, P\0.01 and F[1, 39] = 41.1, P\
0.01, respectively) and for Delay (F[1, 39] = 38.5, P\0.01
and F[1, 39] = 20.1, P\0.01, respectively). Table 2 shows
that overall the probability of choosing the original loca-
tions was lower after the 1-week delay with lower rates for
the Korsakoff group in the Include condition. For the
Exclude condition the reverse trend was observed. The
interaction between Group and Delay was not signiﬁcant
for either condition (Include: F[1, 39] = 1.63, P = 0.21;
Exclude: F[1, 39] = 0.79, P = 0.41).
The PDP methodology assumes independence of con-
scious and unconscious inﬂuences of memory. To verify
this assumption, the percentage of the new objects in which
the pre-assigned target location was chosen was computed.
For the immediate recall test the independence assumption
was conﬁrmed in that no signiﬁcant differences emerged
between conditions (F[1, 39] = 1.76, P = 0.19) or groups
(F[1, 39] = 0.61, P = 0.44) and no interaction effect (F[1,
39] = 0.04, P = 0.84) was found (percentages were 0.23 and
0.27 in the Include and 0.29 and 0.31 in the Exclude
condition for patients and controls, respectively). For the 1-
week delay there was a marginally signiﬁcant difference
between the conditions (F[1, 39] = 3.99, P = 0.053) but
again no signiﬁcant group difference emerged (F[1, 39] =
2.74, P = 0.11) nor an interaction effect (F[1, 39] = 1.6, P =
0.21) (with percentages of 0.17 and 0.30 in the Include and
0.32 and 0.33 in the Exclude condition for the patients and
controls, respectively).
Figure 2 shows the C (conscious inﬂuence of memory)
and U (unconscious inﬂuence of memory) estimates. Two 2
9 2 ANOVAs were performed for C and U separately,
including Delay as the within-subject factor and Group as
the between-subjects factor. The controls had strongly
outperformed the patients on the conscious memory esti-
mates, C (F[1, 39] = 84.4, P\0.01). Delay also yielded a
signiﬁcant effect for the conscious memory scores (F[1,
39] = 63.5, P \ 0.01). The outcomes on the unconscious
inﬂuences of memory were even slightly better in the
patient group (F[1, 39] = 5.13, P = 0.029) but they were not
affected by delay.
To determine whether the U estimates reﬂected true
memory inﬂuences rather than pre-existing preferences to
place objects at particular locations within speciﬁc rooms,
we compared U against chance estimates. Because of the
low number of ‘new-object’ trials (n = 5) in each condition,
we decided to collapse their data as well as those of the
immediate and the delayed recall conditions. Interestingly,
the patients’ unconscious memory scores (averaged over
the immediate and delayed trials) were signiﬁcantly higher
than their chance levels (the percentage that the designated
target location was chosen for the new items, again aver-
aged over the immediate and delayed trials), t[22] = 2.7, P
= 0.014), while the unconscious scores of the controls were
not (t[17] = 1.7, P = 0.16). Chance levels did not differ
between groups (t[39] = 1.8, P = 0.074, with chance being
0.25 ± 0.1 for the patients and 0.31 ± 0.1 for the controls).
Discussion
With our experiment we sought to compare the conscious
and unconscious spatial memory estimates of patients with
Korsakoff amnesia and healthy matched controls as
derived from the process-dissociation procedure (PDP)
developed by Jacoby (1991, 1998) and adapted by Cald-
well and Masson (2001) for object-location memory. The
comparison revealed a twofold dissociation between con-
scious and unconscious inﬂuences of spatial memory in the
patients and the controls. The patients appeared to have a
poor conscious memory of object locations in their natural
surroundings. Yet, and strikingly, they performed slightly
better than the controls on unconscious spatial memory,
showing that unconscious and conscious inﬂuences of
spatial memory are functionally distinct. Caldwell and
Masson (2001) provided evidence in the same direction by
demonstrating that aging had distinct effects on the two
memory scores.
Our evidence of spared unconscious memory inﬂuences
in Korsakoff patients supports several other studies
reporting normal implicit memory performance (Graf et al.
1985; Phaf et al. 2000; Verfaellie et al. 1990; Fama et al.
Table 2 Mean probabilities (+SD) of choosing the original (designated) target locations in the Include and Exclude conditions of the recog-
nition test for the immediate recall and the 1-week delay for the amnesic Korsakoff patients and the healthy controls
Probability original locations Amnesia patients Controls
Immediate After 1 week Immediate After 1 week
Include condition 0.41 (0.12) 0.30 (0.12) 0.64 (0.12) 0.48 (0.12)
Exclude condition 0.25 (0.11) 0.35 (0.08) 0.13 (0.07) 0.19 (0.08)
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1232006) although it contradicts other investigations (Brunfaut
and d’Ydewalle 1996; Verfaellie et al. 1996, 1992). The
disparate observations on implicit memory performance in
amnesics in the literature seem to indicate that the presence
or absence of any difference with normal healthy volun-
teers critically depends on the type of task that is used and
the subform of implicit memory that is being studied (see
also Gooding et al. 2000; Ostergaard 1999). The task we
employed assessed the ability of Korsakoff amnesics and
controls to commit spatial information about natural scenes
resembling familiar, everyday situations to memory.
Because of its clear ecological relevance, unconscious,
automatic retrieval of this type of information could indeed
be boosted given the right circumstances and it, moreover,
appears to be less susceptible for cognitive deterioration
due to both cortical and subcortical brain damage.
The controls having inferior unconscious memory esti-
mates than the Korsakoff patients seems counterintuitive,
but we wish to point out that these estimates were only
above chance in the Korsakoff group and not in the con-
trols, complicating interpretation of the controls’
unconscious memory scores. Their scores may be
underestimates because the controls tended to engage in
strategic contemplation when they found themselves
unable to recollect an item’s original location. Jacoby
(1991, 1998) argues that the process-dissociation procedure
works best if one simply chooses the ﬁrst possibility that
comes to mind when no conscious recollection is available.
A response manner in which options are checked and
choices strategically made is likely to increase the chance
of old locations being excluded, resulting in underestima-
tions of U (Curran and Hintzman 1995). Of particular
importance here could be the fact that Korsakoff patients
are known to suffer executive deﬁcits (Brand 2007) that
clearly hamper the ability to employ efﬁcient strategic
behaviors in cognitive tests. It is very likely that for these
reasons the patients in our study displayed a more direct
‘ﬁrst coming to mind’ strategy than the controls. While we
cannot unequivocally conclude that Korsakoff patients
show stronger unconscious inﬂuences of memory than
healthy controls, our data clearly indicate that Korsakoff
patients maintain some form of residual spatial learning
and/or retrieval in the absence of adequate conscious
recollection.
Of further interest, we showed that recognition after a
prolonged delay yielded distinct effects on the conscious
and unconscious inﬂuences of memory. Conscious mem-
ories had strongly deteriorated after a week, with the
patients displaying a decline comparable to that of their
healthy peers. This could suggest that the main deﬁcit in
Korsakoff patients involves the encoding of rich contextual
memory traces, which can be consciously recollected at a
later time. The well-recorded damage to diencephalic
structures in Korsakoff’s disease may be crucial here, in
analogy with the pattern observed by Kopelman and
Stanhope (1997) during a verbal memory task: in contrast
to the conscious estimates, unconscious inﬂuences of
memory persisted over time.
A methodological issue warranting discussion involves
the fact that the immediate retention interval was not equal
for our two groups. We tested the Korsakoff patients one
minute after the presentation phase, whereas the controls
were tested after a 15-min delay. Similar procedures are
frequently employed to avoid ceiling effects and to nor-
malize the performance levels of patients and controls. One
may, for instance, simplify the material (see Chalfonte
et al. 1996), lengthen the presentation time (Kopelman and
Stanhope 1997; Kopelman et al. 1997) and shorten the
delay (MacAndrew and Jones 1993). In our case one might
argue that the shorter retention interval in the immediate
recall condition may have given the Korsakoff patients an
advantage over the controls, explaining the patients’
superior implicit memory scores. However, this is unlikely
given our observations of a general invariance of implicit
memory over time. Moreover, at the 1-week delay
Fig. 2 Estimates of conscious (a) and unconscious (b) memory
inﬂuences for the Korsakoff amnesia patients and the controls in the
immediate recall and the delayed recall conditions
Exp Brain Res (2008) 190:125–133 131
123retention intervals were equal for patients and controls,
with the Korsakoff patients still showing stronger uncon-
scious memory inﬂuences.
It should be mentioned that the PDP methodology has
had its ﬁerce critics (Curran and Hintzman 1995; Graf and
Komatsu 1994; Joordens and Merikle 1993). In reply, Ja-
coby and colleagues (Jacoby 1998; Jacoby et al. 1997)
further speciﬁed the boundary conditions for an optimal
use of the PDP. In a comparable spatial memory task as the
one we used, Caldwell and Masson (2001) further veriﬁed
the validity of the PDP and the independence of the con-
scious and unconscious memory estimates by applying a
direct-retrieval version of the multinomial model devel-
oped by Buchner et al. (1995) and Jacoby (1998).
The substantial decline in conscious spatial memory
performance in our sample of Korsakoff patients is in
general accordance with the existing literature on spatial
memory in patients with cortical or subcortical lesions.
Besides the diencephalic circuit, the hippocampal forma-
tion, a structure that plays an important role in context
memory and is typically associated with cognitive mapping
of space and explicit spatial memory, is also implicated in
Korsakoff’s syndrome (Chalfonte et al. 1996; Colchester
et al. 2001; Paller et al. 1997; Reed et al. 2003; Visser et al.
1999). Although spatial memory impairments are known to
occur after hippocampal lesions in particular (Kessels et al.
2001, 2004; Maguire et al. 2000; O’Keefe and Nadel 1978;
Spiers et al. 2001), to what extent the damage also affects
unconscious memory inﬂuences is, as yet, unclear. As
mentioned in the ‘‘Introduction’’, Chun and Phelps (1999)
showed that the implicit learning of spatial displays in their
visual search task was diminished in patients with hippo-
campal lesions, whereas Manns and Squire (2001) found
no such evidence. It thus remains to be seen whether the
hippocampus is indeed involved in implicit spatial memory
processes and whether it applies to the implicit mastery of
relative complex spatial conﬁgurations in particular. Pos-
sibly, the formation of simple object–location relations
might be spared at the implicit level.
In conclusion, with the present study we have shown
that the neurocognitive bases of conscious and unconscious
inﬂuences of object–location memory clearly differ.
Amnesic patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome demonstrate
only weak conscious inﬂuences of memory for spatial
information while unconscious inﬂuences are spared.
Future studies will need to investigate whether spatial
information is typically processed unconsciously and
which particular neural circuitries are involved.
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